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Note
Warrantless Search Cases Are Really All the
Same
Will Stancil*
Reading Fourth Amendment case law is a lot like watching
a Law & Order marathon: by the second or third hour, all the
storylines start to repeat themselves. Real-life police investigations, like police procedurals, tend to recycle and interchange
1
key elements. A police dog sniffs a car; a radio beeper monitors
2
3
a home. A police dog sniffs a home; a radio beeper monitors a
4
car. As a result, Fourth Amendment cases have a certain mixand-match quality, and after a while, careful observers might
begin to notice that the old scenarios and new scenarios are
built out of many of the same pieces. But Fourth Amendment
cases often share another trait with cop shows: twist endings.
The writers are always finding new ways to surprise, and even
a minor change in the facts can flip established rules on their
heads, generating outcomes that seem contrary to decades of

* JD/MPP Candidate 2013, University of Minnesota; MA 2008, Queens
University Belfast; BS 2007, Wake Forest University. Thanks to Professor
Barry Feld for his work as this Note’s advisor, Professor Richard Frase for getting excited enough about the original idea that it did not end up in the trash
heap, and to the editors and staff of Minnesota Law Review for their help
bringing the whole thing to publication. Especially Christina McSparron, Jamie Ling, Carl Engstrom, Dan Iden, and whoever left that bottle of top-shelf
whiskey in the freezer (probably Carl Engstrom, again). Additionally, the author would like to thank Jim Morrison (not that Jim Morrison), his parents
(for pretending they enjoyed reading this thing), and Hero Captain Chesley
“Sully” Sullenberger. The author believes that legally-actionable imitation is
the sincerest form of flattery, and therefore disclaims all copyright in this
work. He would, however, appreciate attribution for any borrowed bits, particularly if you are famous.
1. See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 406 (2005); City of Indianapolis
v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 34 –35 (2000).
2. See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 708–10 (1984).
3. See Jardines v. State, 73 So. 3d 34, 35 (Fla. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S.
Ct. 995 (2012).
4. See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 277–78 (1983).
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5

case law. The result is paradoxical: limited factual variation
produces almost limitless doctrinal ambiguity.
When even inveterate observers are unable to predict a
case’s outcome, the effects can be far-ranging. Without clear
precedent to rely upon, trial judges struggle to consistently apply the Fourth Amendment to the variety of police actions be6
ing challenged in their courtrooms. Likewise, the Fourth
Amendment informs the actions of cops on the beat, who need
7
to know what rules constrain their behavior. And at a time
when both scholars and laymen alike have expressed concern
8
over “the incredible shrinking Fourth Amendment,” elusive
search and seizure rules do little to allay fears that privacy is
being eroded.
Because the Supreme Court has always held that warrantless searches are presumptively unconstitutional, many Fourth
Amendment claims revolve around the question of what consti9
tutes a search. One major and often-overlooked source of
Fourth Amendment ambiguity is the absence of any means of
systematizing and comparing the various answers to this question. Judges now generally rely on the standard described by
10
Justice Harlan in Katz v. United States : a search occurs when
5. To use one recent example, after no fewer than three major Supreme
Court cases holding that drug dogs were unique investigatory tools that did
not trigger constitutional protections, Caballes, 543 U.S. at 405; Edmond, 531
U.S. at 32; United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983), the Florida Supreme
Court nonetheless found that use of a drug dog at a suspect’s residence created
an unconstitutional search. Jardines, 73 So. 3d at 55–56.
6. See, e.g., Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83
MICH. L. REV. 1468, 1470–71 (1985) (arguing that lower courts cannot consistently apply the Fourth Amendment absent an explicit interpretative model).
7. See, e.g., David Rossman, Conditional Rules in Criminal Procedure:
Alice in Wonderland Meets the Constitution, 26 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 417, 466
(2010) (“Much of the Court’s recent Fourth Amendment analysis is driven by
its desire to make things simple for the police officers who have to translate
their legal doctrine into action out on the street.”).
8. Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Incredible Shrinking Fourth Amendment,
21 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 257, 257 (1984); jeffgolin, Comment to Jesse Ventura
Sues TSA Over Body Scans, Pat Downs, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 25,
2011, 7:27 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/social/jeffgolin/jesse-ventura
-sues-tsa-ov_n_813460_75090159.html (“The Incredible Shrinking Fourth
Amendment! How we need it now.”).
9. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 32 (2001) (“One might think that
. . . examining the portion of a house that is in plain public view, while it is a
search . . . is not an unreasonable one under the Fourth Amendment. But in
fact we have held that visual observation is no search at all—perhaps in order
to preserve somewhat more intact our doctrine that warrantless searches are
presumptively unconstitutional.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
10. Id. at 32–33 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967)).
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police action violates a person’s reasonable expectation of pri11
vacy. But this standard allows deciding courts to approach
Fourth Amendment questions holistically, rather than address12
ing the component factual elements that make up a case. Too
often, these decisions leave the distinction between a reasonable and unreasonable expectation of privacy bewilderingly
ethereal.
In order to make that distinction more straightforward,
this Note proposes a new procedure for writing and organizing
search and seizure jurisprudence. Part I examines case law to
illustrate that courts following Katz have refused to systematize Fourth Amendment precedent or integrate it into a workable schema. Part II then describes a model which classifies
Fourth Amendment holdings by breaking them into two conceptual elements: the subject of an investigation and the method of an investigation. It uses the model to explain how the defective Katz standard encourages the corrosion of protections
against warrantless searches. Finally, Part III suggests that
courts adopt a more mechanical approach to search and seizure
cases. It argues that law enforcement and the general public
alike would be better served if courts abandoned judicial minimalism and holistic reasoning in favor of compartmentalized
rulemaking. This Note concludes that an analytical framework
which breaks Fourth Amendment searches into a limited set of
conceptual components would promote judicial consistency and
forestall the erosion of privacy protections.
I. A BRIEF AND TROUBLED HISTORY OF THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT
The confusion currently surrounding warrantless searches
and seizures may have been inevitable. The entire body of law
is derived from one brief phrase in the Fourth Amendment:
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and sei13
zures, shall not be violated . . . .” Over a century of jurisprudential uncertainty has stemmed from warring interpretations
of those twenty-four words.
11. Id. at 33; see also Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
12. See Note, The Fourth Amendment’s Third Way, 120 HARV. L. REV.
1627, 1636 (2007) (“The Katz test, by depending on factual particulars and necessitating the interpretation of ambiguous social norms, functions just like a
traditional totality-of-the-circumstances test . . . .”).
13. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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A. PRE-KATZ: THE PROPERTY RIGHTS ERA
Until the middle of the twentieth century, the Supreme
Court maintained a narrow conception of the Fourth Amendment’s protections, arguing that they were, in essence, a de14
fense against government abrogation of property rights. The
logic behind this approach was clear: before the development of
remote surveillance or communications devices, government
agents were physically incapable of conducting a search without trespassing into private property, whether by intruding in15
to a locked house, or surreptitiously opening a letter. This early formulation of Fourth Amendment protections also eased the
task of courts, which could answer the question of whether a
search had occurred by simply determining whether a trespass
had also occurred.
The Court clung to a property rights interpretation of the
Fourth Amendment long after new technology had begun to
threaten its usefulness. In Olmstead v. United States, it held
that the Fourth Amendment did not protect telephone conversations from government wiretapping at a remote location, because the conversation was travelling across lines in which the
16
defendant maintained no property interest. Even in 1928, the
intuitive wrongness of the Olmstead decision was apparent.
The decision was “not well received” and backlash against it
contributed to the passage of the Federal Communications Act,
17
which outlawed wiretapping. Clearly, the Court and the public had very different ideas about the sort of government activity the Fourth Amendment should protect against.
Nonetheless, the Court doubled down on its interpretation,
and over the following decades churned out elaborate rules
about the bounds of proper police surveillance. For example,
one line of cases determined that monitoring devices could be
used if they were placed against the wall of a private resi14. See Daniel Solove, Fourth Amendment Pragmatism, 51 B.C. L. REV.
1511, 1517–18 (2010). Property rights had not always been central to the
Fourth Amendment; in the nineteenth century, the Court relied on other conceptualizations of its protections. See generally Thomas K. Clancy, The Fourth
Amendment’s Concept of Reasonableness, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 977, 978–90.
15. Solove, supra note 14, at 1517–18.
16. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 465 (1928) (“The language of
the amendment can not be extended and expanded to include telephone wires
reaching to the whole world from the defendant’s house or office. The intervening wires are not part of his house or office . . . .”), overruled by Katz, 389 U.S.
at 347.
17. DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW
247 (3d ed. 2009).
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dence, but not if they were driven into the wall. To modern
sensibilities, these distinctions may seem inane, but it is important to remember that they also arise from a formally coherent view of the Fourth Amendment. In the Court’s view, the
conceptual area protected by the Amendment was clearly defined: defendants could expect freedom from physical intrusion
into certain private property and personal effects. Except to the
extent they encroached into these sharply bounded subjects,
the actions of police were irrelevant to the constitutional ques20
tion. But whatever theoretical clarity this interpretation lent
to search and seizure jurisprudence, it seemed more and more a
relic in an age when the government could use new technology
to intrude into privacy without any sort of physical invasion.
B. KATZ AND AFTERMATH
In 1967, the Supreme Court finally addressed the flaws in
its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. In Katz v. United States,
the Court explicitly overruled Olmstead, stating bluntly that
the Constitution “protects people, not places,” and that while
“[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public” is not protected, “what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area
accessible to the public,” is shielded from government eyes by
21
the Fourth Amendment. Katz, in short, represented a paradigm shift in Fourth Amendment law, swapping out the property rights rationale for a privacy-based principle. Justice Harlan’s famous concurrence described an individual’s “reasonable
22
expectation of privacy” as the lynchpin of this new regime, a
23
formulation that has become shorthand for the Katz test.
18. Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 135–36 (1942).
19. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511–12 (1961).
20. Other commentators have described these cases as focusing primarily
on the actions of government agents. See, e.g., Ric Simmons, From Katz to
Kyllo: A Blueprint for Adapting the Fourth Amendment to Twenty-First Century Technologies, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1303, 1308–09 (2002) (arguing that
Olmstead and its progeny focused on the “method of search” of government
agents). It is important, however, to distinguish between the facts discussed
by the court and the interests the court is seeking to protect. The question of
whether a protected subject had been impinged upon might turn entirely on
the actions of government agents, conveying to the careless reader the impression that the actions of government agents are the central subject of inquiry.
21. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
22. Id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring).
23. See, e.g., California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986) (“The touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis is whether a person has a ‘constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.’” (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 360
(Harlan, J., concurring))).

342

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[97:337

A voluminous amount of scholarly ink has been spilled
documenting the many and varied difficulties posed by the Katz
24
decision. But for the purposes of the following analysis, the
most important problem is how Katz altered the interests underlying the Fourth Amendment, and therefore changed the
factual focus of interpreting courts. While the Katz court arguably succeeded in realigning the effect and the purpose of the
Fourth Amendment, this change has come at the cost of clarity.
The reasoning in Olmstead and its successors may have seemed
formalistic, but it was a formalism enabled by clearly delineated, protected subject matter. By comparison, what does Katz
protect (or protect against)? Nearly forty-five years after the
decision, nobody can say for certain. In the words of one scholar, “The reasonable expectation of privacy test is the central
mystery of Fourth Amendment law . . . . [N]o one seems to
know what makes an expectation of privacy constitutionally
25
reasonable.” Olmstead notably disregarded the conduct of the
law officer when determining whether the Fourth Amendment
was implicated. But “reasonable expectations of privacy” might
well refer to expectations about the behavior of government
agents, as well as expectations that a certain subject matter
26
will remain private. In this sense, the Katz test has lengthened the list of factors that courts might take into account
when deciding a Fourth Amendment case, without providing
any guidance as to whether one concern should predominate.
C. KATZ’S CONFUSING PROGENY
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is still haunted by
Katz’s omission of critical information about which specific factors to consider in warrantless search cases. A quick survey of
notable post-Katz search and seizure cases, as well as a few extant theories of Fourth Amendment protection, reveals that
concerns about doctrinal ambiguity are well-founded.

24. For a brief catalogue of some of the most common complaints, see Jed
Rubenfeld, The End of Privacy, 61 STAN. L. REV. 101, 105–15 (2008).
25. Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 STAN.
L. REV. 503, 504 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).
26. But see Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 211 (describing the Katz test as addressing “expectation[s] of privacy in the object of a challenged search” (emphasis
added)); Simmons, supra note 20, at 1305–06 (arguing that Katz was intended
to exclude the method of search from Fourth Amendment analyses altogether).
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1. Kyllo, Caballes, and Bond
27

Kyllo v. United States is one of the most well-known recent search and seizure decisions. Because the case revolved
around the use of an advanced thermal imaging device to investigate a private home, it is commonly cited as a landmark
28
decision regulating new surveillance technologies. The Kyllo
holding, however, actually indicates very little of the Supreme
Court’s reasoning. While Justice Scalia, writing for the majori29
ty, held the search unconstitutional, he failed to identify with
particularity the fact or facts that violated the Fourth Amendment. Instead, he declared that when “[g]overnment uses a device that is not in general public use, to explore details of the
home that would previously have been unknowable without
physical intrusion, the surveillance . . . is presumptively unrea30
sonable without a warrant.” This language suggests that the
Court took both the subject of the search (the interior of a private home) and the officer’s method of conducting the search (a
heat-sensing device) into account when making its decision; it
provides little guidance as to how the decision might have differed if the facts had varied along one of these two dimensions.
In Illinois v. Caballes, the Supreme Court held that the use
of a drug dog during an otherwise lawful traffic stop did not
31
run afoul of the Fourth Amendment. The Court explicitly reconciled its decision with Kyllo, noting that while a dog might be
analogous to a heat sensor, in the earlier case the “device was
32
capable of detecting lawful activity.” The Court explained that
“[t]he legitimate expectation that information about perfectly
lawful activity will remain private is categorically distinguishable from . . . expectations concerning the nondetection of con33
traband in the trunk of [one’s] car.” It concluded that a dog
search only reveals “a substance that no individual has any
right to possess” and therefore does not trigger constitutional
34
protections. Oddly, the rationale behind the Caballes drug-dog
27. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
28. See, e.g., Amy Miller, Note, Kyllo v. United States: New Law Enforcement Technologies and the Fourth Amendment, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 181, 182
(2002) (“The Supreme Court’s holding in Kyllo will implicate other senseenhancing technologies by necessity . . . .”).
29. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40.
30. Id.
31. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 405 (2005).
32. Id. at 409.
33. Id. at 410.
34. Id.
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rule mirrors the reasoning of Olmstead: by effectively refusing
to extend the question of constitutional protection beyond the
nature of the search’s subject, the Court necessarily remains
agnostic about the actual conduct of the government officers.
Other cases, however, demonstrate that the conduct of a
government agent can be determinative in a Fourth Amendment challenge, even when the subject of a search does not necessarily raise privacy concerns. In Bond v. United States, a police officer felt around the outer layer of a bag, searching for the
35
shape of contraband. Although the Court conceded that a
member of the public could have moved or handled the bag, it
upheld the defendant’s constitutional challenge, noting that the
“physically invasive inspection” was itself especially intrusive
36
and could not be reasonably expected. Notably, its analysis
never touched on whether the bag’s owner could have reasonably expected the contents of the bag to remain private even
37
from other, less intrusive searches. A recent Florida Supreme
38
Court decision, Jardines v. State, took a similar approach. In
Jardines, police conducted a search of the outside of a private
39
residence with a drug dog. Although none of the constituent
elements of the search seemed to rise to the level of a constitutional violation, the court held for the defendant on the grounds
that the search method “entail[ed] a degree of public opprobri40
um, humiliation and embarrassment.” Once again, the analysis focused on the conduct of government agents instead of the
41
subject of the search.
2. The Third-Party and Public Exposure Doctrines
In addition to simple factual holdings like those described
in the cases above, a handful of more elaborate theories of
Fourth Amendment protection have been adopted by the
courts. Although they sometimes seem to overlap or conflict
with each other, and are not consistently applied, scholars have

35. Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 335–36 (2000).
36. Id. at 337–39.
37. Id.
38. Jardines v. State, 73 So. 3d 34 (Fla. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 995
(2012).
39. Id. at 37–39.
40. Id. at 48.
41. See id. at 45–49 (discussing the conduct of government agents when
performing dog “sniff tests”).
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recognized several such doctrines emerging in the wake of
42
Katz.
One of the most-criticized variations of Fourth Amendment
law is the so-called “risk assumption theory” or “third-party
43
doctrine.” This doctrine is sometimes evoked when a government search recovers information that the defendant had willingly transferred to a third party. The information can take a
44
variety of forms: a conversation with a secret prison snitch,
45
financial records conveyed to a bank, or even a dialed telephone number (necessarily transmitted to a phone company in
46
order to complete the call). The Supreme Court has reasoned
that the defendant, “in revealing his affairs to another, [assumes the risk] that the information will be conveyed by that
47
person to the Government.” Importantly, the mere possibility
of third party conveyance may sometimes defeat a defendant’s
expectation of privacy—even if the government actually obtained the information through more sophisticated (and more
unexpected) means. For instance, in United States v. White, a
police informant talked to a defendant while wearing a hidden
48
microphone and recorder. The Court held that the defendant
had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the conversation,
because the informant could have written it down from
49
memory; the recordings were admitted into evidence.
A similar vein of logic underlies the “public exposure” doc50
trine. Relying on Katz’s pronouncement that “[w]hat a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office,
is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection,” some courts
have thrown out challenges on the basis that the defendant
took insufficient precautions to protect private information

42. For an overview of the two theories described in this Note, see, for example, Melvin Gutterman, A Formulation of the Value and Means Models of
the Fourth Amendment in the Age of Technologically Enhanced Surveillance,
39 SYRACUSE L. REV. 647, 667–76 (1988) (critiquing the “risk assumption” and
“public exposure” models of constitutional protection).
43. See, e.g., id. at 667–76; Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party
Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 570–73 (2009) (cataloguing common scholarly
critiques of the third-party doctrine).
44. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 746–47 (1971).
45. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 437–39 (1976).
46. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 737–38 (1979).
47. Miller, 425 U.S. at 443.
48. White, 401 U.S. at 746–47.
49. Id. at 751–52.
50. See, e.g., Gutterman, supra note 42, at 673–76.
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51

from the public. In California v. Greenwood, police snooped
through the contents of opaque garbage bags the defendants
52
had placed on the curbside for disposal. Although the Supreme Court conceded that members of the public were unlikely to inspect the defendants’ garbage, it nonetheless held that
no constitutional violation occurred, reasoning that the bags
53
had been theoretically accessible to the public. The public exposure rule focuses on where a defendant may reasonably expect the public to go, not where a member of the public is legally permitted to go. For example, one offshoot of the public
exposure rule—the “open fields” doctrine—explicitly disclaims
any expectation of privacy in open outdoor areas, even when
those areas cannot be observed without crossing into clearly
54
marked private property.
3. United States v. Jones
One recent case seems destined to shake up Fourth
Amendment doctrine even further, though its full implications
have yet to be felt. In United States v. Jones, the courts
addressed the warrantless installation of a GPS tracking device
55
on a suspect’s car. The tracking device was left in operation
for weeks, continuously monitoring the suspect’s movements
56
over that span. Although previous decisions had held that the
Fourth Amendment could not protect publicly observable
57
automotive travel —an approach that comports well with the
“public exposure” doctrine described above—the D.C. Circuit
58
court in Jones avoided that precedent by reframing the facts.
It differentiated public travel in the short term from the
51. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
52. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 37–38 (1988).
53. Id. at 39–41.
54. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 179 (1984) (“[A]s a practical
matter these lands usually are accessible to the public and the police in ways
that a home, an office, or commercial structure would not be. It is not generally true that fences or “No Trespassing” signs effectively bar the public from
viewing open fields in rural areas.”).
55. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 948 (2012).
56. Id.
57. See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281–86 (1983).
58. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 557 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff’d
sub nom. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 945 (“Knotts held only that ‘[a] person traveling
in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another, not that such a person has
no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements whatsoever, world
without end . . . .’” (quoting Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281)).
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aggregate of all travel over a prolonged period, and extended
59
Fourth Amendment protection to the latter subject.
While the Supreme Court affirmed the Circuit Court’s
judgment, it appears to have partially abandoned its ra60
tionale. Instead, Justice Scalia, writing for the majority,
adopted a trespass-based approach evocative of the Olmstead61
era property rights regime. Scalia maintained that the suspect’s car was, as a personal “effect,” an explicitly protected
subject of the Fourth Amendment; the placement of the tracking device on the car therefore constituted an impermissible
62
trespass against private property. Confusingly, the opinion
never firmly establishes whether trespasses are unreasonable
under the Katz rubric, or if Scalia believes that the propertybased conception of the Fourth Amendment is a separate
63
strand of law coexisting with Katz. Adding to the jumble, at
least five concurring justices seem to argue that long-term GPS
monitoring would be unconstitutional—though they seem split
64
on whether the problem is the duration or the use of GPS.
Even this small selection of cases and theories reveals disagreement and confusion over the interests that the Fourth
Amendment seeks to protect. But the confusion gets much
worse when the precedential effect of the decisions is considered.

59. Id. at 561–64.
60. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 954 (asserting that Jones “does not require [the
Court] to answer” whether GPS tracking is unconstitutional).
61. Id. at 951 (“Katz . . . established that property rights are not the sole
measure of Fourth Amendment violations, but did not snuff out the previously
recognized protection for property.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
62. Id. at 950.
63. The opinion provides support for both conceptions. Scalia argues that
“Jones’s Fourth Amendment rights do not rise or fall with the Katz formulation,” that “Katz did not repudiate that [property-based] understanding” of the
Amendment, and that the “reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has been
added to, not substituted for, the common-law trespassory test.” Id. at 950,
952. But he also describes how expectations about property rights are embedded within reasonable expectations of privacy, suggesting that Katz still anchors Fourth Amendment law. Id. at 951 (“We have embodied that preservation of past rights in our very definition of ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’
which we have said to be an expectation ‘that has a source outside of the
Fourth Amendment . . . by reference to concepts of real or personal property
law . . . .’” (citation omitted)).
64. Id. at 954–57 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 957–64 (Alito, J., concurring, joined by Ginsburg, J., Breyer, J., and Kagan, J.).
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D. THE FAILURE OF FOURTH AMENDMENT PRECEDENT
Many scholars have expressed concern that Katz and modern Fourth Amendment doctrine will allow new technology to
erode traditional boundaries of privacy from government intru65
sion. But the simple truth is that, under Katz, those boundaries were never very clear in the first place. The forwardlooking focus on technology obscures an even more fundamental weakness of Fourth Amendment doctrine: the inability of
courts and scholars to consistently interpret prior decisions.
This defect frustrates not only attempts to control the use of
sophisticated GPS trackers and thermal imaging devices, but
also attempts to prevent rudimentary police rummaging of the
sort that has existed for centuries.
The problem is most visible in the lower courts. Consider
Coffin v. Brandau, an unremarkable Fourth Amendment case
66
decided in the Eleventh Circuit during the spring of 2011. In
Coffin, the court spent a significant portion of its decision determining whether government agents violated the Fourth
Amendment by entering an open garage to knock on an interior
67
door to a home. After discussing at length three earlier cases
in which entry into a garage had been deemed an unconstitutional search, the court nonetheless decided that prior Fourth
Amendment decisions provide no clear rule regarding the con68
stitutional status of attached garages. Although the court
eventually determined that the Fourth Amendment was indeed
violated, it relied on an ambiguous “totality of the circumstanc69
es” test to reach its holding.
65. See, e.g., Adam W. Brill, Note, Kyllo v. United States: Is the Court’s
Bright-Line Rule on Thermal Imaging Written in Disappearing Ink?, 56 ARK.
L. REV. 431, 454 (2003) (“Regardless of how future courts address this issue,
technology remains an inherent threat to the sanctity of the home.”); Jeffrey
W. Childers, Comment, Kyllo v. United States: A Temporary Reprieve from
Technology-Enhanced Surveillance of the Home, 81 N.C. L. REV. 728, 762
(2003) (“[A]t best Kyllo offers a temporary reprieve from the governmental intrusion of technology-enhanced surveillance.”).
66. Coffin v. Brandau, 642 F.3d 999 (11th Cir. 2011). Although Coffin was
picked at random for the purpose of illustration, it exemplifies many of the
problems this Note seeks to discuss. This is no great coincidence. The conceptual uncertainties that plague Fourth Amendment jurisprudence are deeply
rooted, and manifest themselves equally in cases related to garage doors, drug
dogs, third-party informants, and other common search and seizure questions.
67. Id. at 1009–13.
68. Id. at 1011 (discussing Taylor v. United States, 286 U.S. 1 (1932);
United States v. Sokolow, 450 F.2d 324 (5th Cir. 1971); Kauz v. United States,
95 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1938)).
69. Id. at 1012.
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Tellingly, the officers in Coffin successfully raised a qualified immunity defense, because there was no constitutional rule
that “with obvious clarity” forbade them from entering the gar70
age. The court drily noted that few Fourth Amendment cases
will ever meet the “obvious clarity” standard, because the “expectation of privacy context is inherently fact-specific, thus not
71
lending itself to clearly established law.”
Coffin and the other post-Katz decisions reveal a Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence that is failing in several directions
at once. Search and seizure rules are difficult to predict, and
difficult to interpret. They force valuable judicial resources to
be spent pursuing minor factual questions. They are too fluid to
provide much comfort to private individuals, and too factspecific to provide guidance to police officers.
II. THE MECHANICS OF FOURTH AMENDMENT LAW
For decades, legal scholars have hoped to bring some
measure of order to the chaos surrounding the Fourth Amendment. Countless law review articles have attempted to build
models that reconcile the contradictions in search and seizure
72
jurisprudence. A great many of these models begin with a
search for first principles; they cast about for the one legal theory (or the small set of theories) that can unify the many cases
73
that make up Fourth Amendment doctrine. As Orin Kerr has
astutely observed, these efforts are all doomed to at least partial failure: “With so many decided cases and so few agreedupon principles at work, trying to understand the Fourth
Amendment is a bit like trying to put together a jigsaw puzzle
70. Id. at 1014 –15 (quoting United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 271
(1997)).
71. Id. at 1015.
72. See, e.g., Clancy, supra note 14, at 978 (describing five separate models of reasonableness used by the Court and proposing a unified objective model of reasonableness); Kerr, supra note 25, at 508 (“There are four different
models of Fourth Amendment protection–four relatively distinct categories of
argument used to justify whether a reasonable expectation of privacy exists.”);
Scott E. Sundby, A Return to Fourth Amendment Basics: Undoing the Mischief
of Camara and Terry, 72 MINN. L. REV. 383, 384 (1988) (redefining the concept
of reasonableness to “reflect the [Fourth] [A]mendment’s underlying values
and purposes”).
73. For an article that demonstrates both the appeal and the limitations
of this approach, see generally Gutterman, supra note 42 (depicting pre- and
post-Katz tensions in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence as the interplay between competing values-based and means-based interpretations of limitations
on government power).
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with several incorrect pieces: no matter which way you try to
74
assemble it, a few pieces won’t fit.”
This Note also proposes a model to help deconstruct the
Fourth Amendment, but it is a model with a somewhat different focus than most. At least initially, it discards the question
of first principles. Instead, it categorizes Fourth Amendment
decisions by their practical meaning. In doing so, it views each
Fourth Amendment decision as, first and foremost, the result of
a collection of intertwining rules—for instance, a rule that allows police to use dogs to sniff out drugs, or a rule that forbids
warrantless entry into a home—and asks how best to parse out
those rules from the complex factual patterns presented by the
case.
The proposed model does not attempt to deconstruct the
social or practical values that form the basis for these rules. Instead, it focuses as much as possible on the mechanical and logical structure of the rules, and how best to describe their interactions with each other and with the Fourth Amendment’s
theoretical framework. In doing so, it seeks to create a descriptive taxonomy that can be applied to multiple strands of Fourth
Amendment analysis.
Once its groundwork is laid, this model can be expanded to
predict the precedential effect of particular Fourth Amendment
holdings. It explains why rules that expand the scope of the
constitutional protections may be less robust and influential
than rules that limit protections. Finally, the model suggests at
least one pathway out of the legal cul-de-sac that is the Katz
regime.
A. THE UNIVERSAL STRUCTURE OF SEARCHES
At first glance, the endless variety of searches that could
potentially fall under the Fourth Amendment’s purview may
seem to have nothing in common. But that initial perception is
not quite correct. All Fourth Amendment searches—in fact, all
searches of any kind—share a common conceptual structure. So
far, this Note has only hinted at those shared features; in order
to proceed any further, they must now be described in detail.
All searches contain two distinct elements: a passive, protected subject and an active method of investigation. These are
the two basic components from which the concept of a “search”
is formed. Taken alone, the mere presence of each element in a
74. Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 809 (2004).
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fact pattern does not have any predictive power; indeed, both
are always present in every Fourth Amendment case, whatever
the outcome. Without them, there could be no cognizable
Fourth Amendment question at all. The key feature of this
Note’s proposed model is its bifurcation of all Fourth Amendment fact patterns into these two components. Each component
has unique properties that distinguish it from the other.
First, all searches begin with a protected subject of some
description. In this definition, both the words “protected” and
“subject” must be given their broadest possible meanings. The
75
76
subject could be a physical space, a private fact, or some artificial category of information, such as the aggregate of an indi77
vidual’s movements over time. And the subject might be afforded its protection by both tangible barriers (fences,
78
geographic remoteness, or computer security) and intangible
ideas (public warnings, social norms, or even just a person’s unfounded belief that a certain subject will remain unknown to
79
the government). The protected subject can be described as
the set of features or facts that existed prior to any investigatory action. Without a subject, there can be no search, but only
government action targeted at nothing, affecting nobody.
The second component of a search is the method by which
it was undertaken. When a search occurs, the protected subject
suffers some intrusion. The combined set of actions, devices,
techniques, and procedures used to effect the intrusion comprise the method of the search. Once again, this component
75. See, e.g., Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180–81 (1984) (discussing the distinction between “open fields” and a dwelling’s “curtilage” for
Fourth Amendment purposes).
76. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 437 (1976) (denying
challenge to government collection of bank records).
77. See United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 560–61 (D.C. Cir. 2010)
(suggesting that the “whole may be more revealing than the parts”), aff’d sub
nom. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
78. See, e.g., California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 209 (1986) (“Police were
unable to observe the contents of respondent’s yard from ground level because
of a 6-foot outer fence and a 10-foot inner fence completely enclosing the
yard.”); Oliver, 466 U.S. at 174 (“[T]he court noted that the field itself is highly
secluded: it is bounded on all sides by woods, fences, and embankments and
cannot be seen from any point of public access.”); United States v. Andrus, 483
F.3d 711, 721 (10th Cir. 2007) (“[Defendant] argues his computer’s password
protection indicated his computer was ‘locked’ to third parties . . . .”).
79. See Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 211 (“Respondent contends he has done all
that can reasonably be expected to tell the world he wishes to maintain the
privacy of his garden . . . . [H]e asserts he has not ‘knowingly’ exposed himself
to aerial views.”); Oliver, 466 U.S. at 173 (“He had posted ‘No Trespassing’
signs at regular intervals . . . .”).
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must be defined as broadly as possible. It includes any and all
government action, even if that action has not traditionally
been seen as an investigative technique giving rise to constitutional protections. Without a method of investigation, there can
also be no search.
Importantly, while the two components are distinct, they
cannot be fully disconnected. Neither element can be described
in isolation without omitting important information about the
search as a whole. The breadth of the intrusion into a particular subject depends largely on the method of investigation (recall Olmstead’s wiretaps, which uncovered private phone con80
versations but left private property untouched). Similarly, the
nature of an investigatory method may depend on how the sub81
ject of an investigation is defined.
Because both subject and method are conceptual characterizations of a physical action, a single real-life search can usually be described as having multiple subjects and methods. For
instance, if the government intercepts a sealed doctor’s note,
the subject of its search might be described both as a letter, and
as private medical information. Either possibility (or both!)
may have constitutional consequences. A high-profile example
of this dynamic occurred in the recent Jones case, where the
circuit court and Supreme Court portrayed the subject and
82
method of the search differently. While the circuit court de83
scribed a GPS search of the suspect’s aggregated movements,
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion employed a different characterization: “It is important to be clear about what occurred in
this case: The Government physically occupied private property
84
for the purpose of obtaining information.” All discussions of
constitutionality aside, the important thing to note here is that
both descriptions are correct. The search method involved both
GPS and a physical trespass, and the subject was both private
property and the suspect’s aggregated travel.

80. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
81. One recent example of this relationship can be seen in Maynard, 615
F.3d at 556. In Maynard, the court rejected the government’s contention that
GPS tracking was functionally identical to earlier forms of monitoring a suspect’s movement, noting that GPS trackers could monitor movements over a
longer period of time than earlier technologies. By broadening the subject of
the search to include a larger timeframe, the court reframed the method used.
82. Compare Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 945, with Maynard, 615 F.3d at 544.
83. See Maynard, 615 F.3d at 563.
84. Jones, 132 S. Ct at 949.
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These observations can be generalized even further, and
developed into a basic conceptual structure for all real-life
searches. As with Jones above, any event constituting a search
can be perceived as utilizing many different methods, and targeting many different subjects. Each subject can then be paired
off with each and every method, and the sum total of possible
pairings represents all the conceivable ways the search might
be described. For example, using Jones’s two methods and two
subjects, four pairings are possible: (1) GPS and private property, (2) GPS and aggregated movement, (3) physical trespass
and aggregated movement, and (4) physical trespass and private property. (Common sense suggests that most searches will
have more than four possible pairings, however.) For a court to
reject any search, one or more of the constituent pairings must
prove offensive to the Fourth Amendment. In theory, all Fourth
Amendment rules can be reduced to two independent variables,
and a third dependent variable: a subject and a method, and a
corresponding determination of the search’s overall constitutionality or unconstitutionality.
This model describes search and seizure rules at the highest level of abstraction, but causes major practical difficulties.
It is an inefficient and unnatural way of creating usable legal
principles because it requires an individual determination for
each and every conceivable variation of subject and method—
an effectively infinite number of possible combinations. In order
to surmount this obstacle, courts utilize decision principles—
what we popularly conceive as Fourth Amendment rules. These
can take many forms. For instance, under the Olmstead principle, any constituent pairing which did not include some form of
85
private property as the subject was deemed constitutional.
Kyllo suggests that any pairing with the interior of a house as
86
the subject is probably unconstitutional. The third-party rule
excludes from protection any pairing in which the subject was
87
revealed to a third party. And so on.
While somewhat ancillary to the remainder of the discussion, this model is still important. It describes, in the most
basic terms, the challenge courts face when they make Fourth
Amendment rules, and when they interpret Fourth Amend85. See Simmons, supra note 20, at 1309.
86. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001).
87. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (“This Court has held
repeatedly that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third person and conveyed by him to Government authorities . . . .”); see supra note 43 and accompanying text.
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ment precedent. Many of the difficulties posed arise directly
from the process laid out above: the need to somehow transform
discrete conceptualizations of individual fact patterns into
broad rules that can be applied in many different circumstances.
B. THE ROLE OF SUBJECT AND METHOD IN FOURTH
AMENDMENT CASES
All Fourth Amendment rules (and therefore, cases) necessarily collapse into two independent questions: Is the subject of
the search acceptable? Is the method of the search acceptable?
This principle is difficult to prove conclusively, but simple
to illustrate with a very straightforward hypothetical. Imagine
a police officer peeping through the keyhole of a locked house.
One could imagine any number of reasons why this action
might prove unconstitutional. The house may be a specially
protected area, and any government entry into it might violate
88
the Fourth Amendment. Alternatively, keyhole spying might
be so fundamentally unreasonable a method of information
89
gathering that the search is automatically unconstitutional. A
court might decide that, because a house is locked, the owner
has manifested a subjective desire for privacy in that space
90
that ought to be recognized and protected. Or a court might
find that the house being locked leaves it shielded against any
otherwise appropriate method of observation—but that would
first require a determination of which methods are and are not
91
appropriate.
This brief hypothetical demonstrates two ideas. First, it
shows how quickly the complexity of Fourth Amendment rea88. See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980) (“[T]he Fourth
Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house.”).
89. This might be analogous to the “physically invasive inspection” in
Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 337 (2000). There, the Court found that
tactile manipulations were significantly more intrusive than visual searches
or light frisks, and so an agent’s probing of a passenger’s bag on a bus was inherently unconstitutional. Id.
90. Cf. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 11 (1977) (“By placing personal effects inside a double-locked footlocker, respondents manifested an expectation that the contents would remain free from public examination.”);
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967) (“[W]hat [a person] seeks to
preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.”).
91. Cf. State v. Smith, 181 A.2d 761, 769 (N.J. 1962) (“Peering through a
window or a crack in a door or a keyhole is not, in the abstract, genteel behavior, but the Fourth Amendment does not protect against all conduct unworthy
of a good neighbor.”).
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soning can grow, as straightforward, values-based determinations are replaced by more complex inquiries. Second, it suggests the way in which, no matter how complex its reasoning
gets, the court ultimately must evaluate the facts along the two
basic dimensions described above. In a sense, search and seizure fact patterns can be reduced to two binary variables, each
of which can be addressed independently of the other.
Of course, breaking all the features of a Fourth Amendment case into two mutually exclusive variables is of little use,
absent some guidance on what those variables mean and how
they interrelate. The subject/method model does not make any
assumptions about the relative importance of one variable over
another; instead, it relies on case law and precedent to determine which features of a search are important and which are
not. In theory, Fourth Amendment case law should provide a
set of instructions that helps judges and police officers integrate the two independent components. So far, there are three
great unknowns in the model, all of which should be resolved
by precedent: first, how do you determine which subjects are
protected? Second, how do you determine what methods are allowable? Third, what is the relationship between the two variables?
Olmstead’s school of property-based Fourth Amendment
rights illustrates how case law can provide answers to all three
92
of these questions. Under the Olmstead regime, subjects in
93
which the defendant had a property right were protected. Any
method that intruded upon those property rights was pro94
scribed. And the relationship was hierarchical, with the
boundaries of the protected area determining the limits of po95
lice action.
That same analytical lens, when turned on Katz and its
progeny, quickly reveals the conceptual chaos that defines
modern Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Katz’s privacybased system can answer none of the three questions that
96
Olmstead addressed so straightforwardly. Under Katz, the
answer is always the same: a search is unconstitutional when it
runs afoul of “expectation[s] of privacy . . . that society is pre92. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928), overruled by
Katz, 389 U.S. at 347.
93. See id.
94. See id.
95. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
96. See The Fourth Amendment’s Third Way, supra note 12, at 1636.
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97

pared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’” Presumably, this formulation applies equally to the component elements of a search, so
that a subject is protected if it attracts reasonable expectations
of privacy, and a method is proscribed if it violates reasonable
expectations of privacy. The relationship between the two variables remains undefined.
It is little surprise that this absence of specifics has given
birth to all manner of competing interpretations and seeming
contradictions. Receiving so little direction on the fundamental
questions raised by the Fourth Amendment, courts have been
forced to simply make up rules as they go. The correct technique for determining whether the method or subject of a
search is unconstitutional has drifted about, as courts have
wrestled to fit the confusing precedent together. So in Caballes,
the dog sniff case, the Court seems to ignore the method of investigation altogether, instead basing its entire analysis on an
evaluation of the protectedness of the subject (in this case, con98
traband). In Bond, the bag handling case, the Court avoided
any discussion of the degree to which bags were subject to
Fourth Amendment protection, grounding its decision in the
99
unforeseeably intrusive method used by the police officer.
Jardines also focused heavily on police conduct, reserving
harsh words for the unnecessarily embarrassing method with
100
which officers carried out a dog sniff.
More complex manifestations of modern Fourth Amendment case law—for example, the “assumption of risk” and “public exposure” theories—land somewhere between Olmstead and
Katz in terms of providing helpful guidance. Like Olmstead,
these doctrines supply principles for evaluating the constitutionality of a search’s components, and help pin down the relationship between the search’s subject and method. But because
they are only part of the perplexing collection of rules that defines the Katz regime, they are haunted by uncertainty about
the scope of their application.
97. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
98. See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408–09 (2005).
99. See Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338–39 (2000). Although the
Court noted that “[a] travelers’ personal luggage is clearly an ‘effect’ protected
by the Amendment,” in doing so it only allowed for the possibility of Fourth
Amendment protection of personal luggage, rather than suggesting that the
subject’s characteristics were in any way dispositive in the case. Id. at 336.
100. See Jardines v. State, 73 So. 3d 34, 48 (Fla. 2011) (“[S]uch dramatic
government activity in the eyes of many-neighbors, passers-by, and the public
at large-will be viewed as an official accusation of crime.”).
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The “assumption of risk” analysis focuses on the subject
variable. It primarily functions as a procedure for determining
whether a subject can receive constitutional protection. It provides a criterion for making that determination: did the defendant intentionally communicate the subject to a third par101
ty? If so, the subject receives no protection. The deciding
court might then address the “method” variable separately. Alternatively, it might hold, as in White, that the Constitution
does not provide protection from methods of investigation that
only uncover what could have been revealed by the third par102
ty.
The public exposure doctrine takes a parallel form. Although the rule is most often stated in terms of a search’s subject—i.e., subjects are not protected if a defendant takes inade103
quate precautions to protect them from the public’s eyes —the
doctrine actually asks the court to make a determination about
different methods of search. In order to decide whether a defendant took reasonable precautions, a court must first decide
what methods of observation could be reasonably expected from
the public. (For instance, the public might ignore a “No Tres104
passing” sign, but probably would not be scanning houses
105
with heat sensors.)
Here again, as in the cases described above, the complicated doctrinal questions facing courts collapse into a straightforward, factual, and somewhat arbitrary assessment of the
search’s subject or method. While case law describes any number of winding paths towards a Fourth Amendment holding—
some better marked than others—all of these paths require
courts to eventually reckon with the two fundamental features
of every search.
C. THE SUBJECT/METHOD MODEL AND PRECEDENT
Katz’s lack of theoretical clarity could be excused if courts
offered a strong system of precedent-based rules as an alternative. Instead of relying on a strong, predictable set of principles,
trial courts and police officers could consult an extensive, well101. Gutterman, supra note 42, at 667–68 (discussing the assumption of
risk analysis).
102. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 746–47 (1971).
103. Gutterman, supra note 42, at 672–75 (discussing the public exposure
doctrine after Katz).
104. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 179 (1984).
105. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (describing a heat sensor as a “device . . . not in general public use”).
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defined set of search and seizure rules. Although the rationales
for these rules might be fuzzy, their universal applicability
could, at least, provide guidelines with which private citizens
and law enforcement could protect themselves.
Unfortunately, Katz seriously frustrates efforts to create a
working body of precedent. The fundamental problem is simple:
because courts often do not appreciate or answer the full, twodimensional question raised by search and seizure cases, even
well-known Fourth Amendment fact patterns are often functionally devoid of concrete information. These famous cases—
and their less-famous peers—provide little guidance to interpreting courts. Worse still, the problem is asymmetric. Factual
features that do not raise constitutional issues can be described
with considerable specificity, while features that do implicate
the Fourth Amendment remain hidden behind a fog of interpretative ambiguity. This dynamic creates straightforward exceptions to the warrant requirement, but few equivalently
straightforward rules proscribing government conduct. As a result, the number of allowable searches available to the government has increased over time, without strong, simple boundaries or protections to act as counterweights.
The asymmetry created in Fourth Amendment precedent is
a consequence of the vagueness of the Katz “reasonable expectation of privacy” test. There are multiple routes by which a
court might reach the holding that a search was in violation of
the Fourth Amendment; broadly speaking, a search might violate expectations of privacy related to a particular subject or a
particular method of search. But there is only one route to finding that no violation occurred at all: none of the facts of the
search were sufficient to create a constitutional problem. This
dynamic is illustrated in the table below.
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Table 1
Subject

Method

Search is . . .

Unreasonable
Unreasonable
Reasonable
Reasonable
Reasonable

Unreasonable
Reasonable
Unreasonable
Reasonable
Reasonable

Unconstitutional
Unconstitutional
Unconstitutional
106
Unconstitutional
Constitutional

Table 1: The constitutional status of the elements of the underlying
search can only be predicted if the search is itself held to be constitutional. Without additional information, the four shaded unconstitutional scenarios are indistinguishable to an outside observer.

The logic of Katz, however, does not require courts to report which particular element of a search violated reasonable
expectations of privacy; instead, decisions are often decided by
107
“the facts of the case” or based in “the totality of the circum108
stances.” If, at a later date, another court wishes to use the
earlier decision as guidance, the only useful pieces of information available are the facts of the case and the holding itself.
But because the holding could have arisen from more than one
fact, no clearly defined rule can be parsed out of the earlier decision.
1. A Demonstration of How Katz Precedent Fails
The problem is perhaps most easily illustrated with a hypothetical. Imagine that a police helicopter, flying low and slow
through a residential subdivision, spies a neighborhood bully
conducting a drug deal inside his backyard treehouse. The bully is arrested and convicted, and he appeals his conviction on
Fourth Amendment grounds.

106. This row represents the possibility of a sui generis holding—a search
that is unconstitutional only because of the unique interaction of an otherwiseacceptable subject and method. Katz, after all, does not force courts to find a
search constitutional simply because the court believes all of the search’s underlying elements are constitutional when they are viewed in isolation.
107. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 557 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (citing
United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 283 (1983)), aff’d sub nom. United
States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012); see also Dow Chem. Co. v. United
States, 476 U.S. 227, 238 n.5 (1986) (“Fourth Amendment cases must be decided on the facts of each case, not by extravagant generalizations.”).
108. See, e.g., Coffin v. Brandau, 642 F.3d 999, 1012 (11th Cir. 2011) (“We
hold . . . under the totality of the circumstances, the Deputies’ entry . . . was a
violation of the Fourth Amendment.”).
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First, assume that the circuit court upholds the challenge,
citing Katz. The decision is brief, and merely notes that, on the
facts of the case, the defendant’s reasonable expectations of
privacy have been violated. Later that year, the police arrest
the same defendant for conducting a drug deal in the same
treehouse. This time, however, the police are cautious to use a
clearly permissible method of observation and watch the
treehouse from a public street. When a second constitutional
challenge is raised, the trial court looks to the earlier case in
order to decide the only extant issue: whether treehouses receive Fourth Amendment protection.
As it turns out, the earlier case provides no help. This is
because the circuit court, following Katz, never made clear the
true basis of its decision. It never said whether the treehouse
received special constitutional protection from prying eyes, or if
the Constitution simply forbade police observation from lowflying helicopters. Unfortunately, the choice between these two
rationales might prove determinative. The trial court is forced
to relitigate the issue as a question of first impression.
Now, assume instead that the circuit court rejected the initial challenge, albeit with a similarly thin explanation. Suddenly, however, the second case becomes simple to resolve. Because
the first search did not trigger constitutional protections, it follows that no component of that search, standing alone, could
have been sufficient to trigger constitutional protections. The
district court throws out the challenge, confident that it has
correctly interpreted existing case law.
2. Where Katz Precedent Already Has Failed
This is not a fanciful hypothetical. Instead, it describes the
exact problem that faced the Coffin court, which was similarly
109
frustrated in its attempts to consult case precedent. Unable
to determine whether attached garages have special constitutional protection of the sort that has been given to houses—in
other words, unable to decide whether previous courts had used
a subject-based or method-based rationale—the court was obli110
gated to simply consider the case without any real guidance.
109. Id. at 1011 (“[Prior cases] establish that Fourth Amendment protection is afforded to certain garages under certain circumstances, but they cannot and do not control the answer to the question of whether this garage was
entitled to Fourth Amendment protection under the circumstances of this
case.”).
110. Id.

2012]

WARRANTLESS SEARCH CASES

361

The Coffin decision should give pause. Given the ubiquity
of attached garages, and the frequency of Fourth Amendment
challenges, it strains belief that the Eleventh Circuit had not
developed a clear rule for attached garages. Even more disturbing is the apparent uselessness of the preexisting precedent.
Although the facts of Coffin only narrowly distinguished it from
the earlier cases—the primary difference was whether the interior door had been visible from the exterior of the garage—the
Coffin court was unable to divine the rationales behind the earlier decisions and was therefore unable to determine whether
111
the slight factual distinction should also alter the outcome.
And rather than resolving the garage problem, Coffin perpetuates it: its “totality of the circumstances” test provides perilously little assistance to any lower court unlucky enough to need
112
guidance on the question. Coffin provides strong evidence
that Katz’s theoretical flaw has indeed manifested itself in the
real world.
113
Kyllo creates a similar dilemma. The decision describes a
multi-faceted privacy violation: it bases its holding on the observation of the interior of a private home, and the use of a
114
heat-sensing device in the course of the investigation. Despite
Justice Scalia’s extensive discussion of the facts, the Kyllo decision could be used to support three very different holdings:
first, that the location of the search is determinative, and that
the use of heat-sensing devices elsewhere is allowed; second,
that the heat-sensing device is determinative, and less invasive
means of observing a home are allowed; third, that neither are
allowed, and the search created two separate Fourth Amendment violations.
The same problem manifests anytime a court decides a
Fourth Amendment case using a “totality of the circumstances”
test—or any time a court justifies an ambiguous Fourth
Amendment holding by broad reference to Katz’s “reasonable
expectations of privacy” test. If the constitutional protections
are extended, uncertainty over which facts actually triggered
them will prevent the creation of a strong precedent. If, however, the Fourth Amendment is not invoked, subsequent courts
111. Id. at 1010–11.
112. Id. at 1012.
113. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001).
114. Id. (upholding a challenge to a search in which the “Government
use[d] a device that is not in general public use, to explore details of the home
that would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion”).

362

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[97:337

can safely assume that none of the case’s factual elements are
worthy of protection.
3. The Cost of Katz’s Failure
The inbuilt lopsidedness of Fourth Amendment precedent
under Katz threatens privacy protections. First and foremost, it
allows the same constitutional question to appear in front of a
court multiple times without ever receiving a conclusive resolution. In fact, a court could theoretically address the same set of
facts an indefinite number of times. But the first time a court
finds that the facts do not implicate the Fourth Amendment,
the question is resolved with finality. Those factual circumstances, standing alone, will never again carry the possibility of
constitutional protection.
Second, the structural asymmetry of the Katz test favors
the government over private citizens. The model above predicts
that, as the case law develops, the known set of variables that
do not constrain government action will grow at a much faster
rate than the set of variables that do constrain government action. The government may eventually—if it has not already—
find itself at a marked advantage when determining what sort
of searches it can safely conduct. On the other hand, to the extent that private citizens are relying on rules derived from
Katz, they will not be able to point with much confidence to areas that are free from government intrusion, or types of surveillance from which they are safe.
Finally, the Katz test contains a subjective element: reasonable expectations of privacy are not possible without subjec115
tive expectations of privacy. Concerns have been raised about
116
the circularity of this requirement. If the government gives
citizens no reason to expect privacy, does the Fourth Amendment lose all its potency? The difficulty in identifying clear-cut
Fourth Amendment protections adds a twist to this problem.
An overview of Fourth Amendment case law reveals many areas that are categorically unprotected, and very few that are
categorically protected. Depending on how strictly courts inter115. See, e.g., Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104 (1980) (requiring a
defendant to show that he had a “legitimate expectation of privacy,” of which a
subjective expectation of privacy is a prerequisite); Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“[T]here is a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of
privacy . . . .”).
116. See Rubenfeld, supra note 24, at 106 (“Commentators have long condemned the ‘reasonable expectations of privacy’ test as ineluctably circular.”).
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pret the subjective requirement in the future, the struggle to
build strong Fourth Amendment protections via case law could
have a detrimental effect on the very scope of the Amendment
itself.
D. WHAT THE MODEL REVEALS
In a way, the subject/method model only confirms what
seems intuitively wrong about the Katz test from the very beginning. It demonstrates that Katz has encouraged courts to rely on a reliably fluid non-standard, and created a Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence that is as malleable as it is unpredictable. Scholars have been making the same observation for
decades, even without the help of fancy models like the one in
117
this Note.
But the subject/method model also reveals several other interesting facts. First, it shows how Katz, as applied, is uniquely
ill-suited to the construction of strong, privacy-oriented case
precedent. Second, it suggests that, at times, Katz’s privacy
language may just serve as a gloss. Judges applying Katz are
required to look at the same facts as judges under any other
Fourth Amendment regime. Third, it highlights the way in
which analyzing search and seizure rules can become complex
no matter what value or interest those rules ostensibly support.
Intricate Fourth Amendment rules are not a product of Katz
alone and could form almost as easily even if another case was
governing search jurisprudence.
Even at this point, one nagging criticism of the model remains: what if it is incomplete? While the division between subject and method seems natural enough, has a logical basis, and
often appears—both implicitly and explicitly—in Fourth
Amendment cases, one might still envision a different taxonomy for government searches. Perhaps, instead of method and
subject, two other characteristics are chosen. Or perhaps a
third characteristic is added, or even a fourth. (Two possible
culprits: the party who conducted the search, and the crime
118
that triggered the search.)
117. See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 74, at 822 (“Katz is a Rorschach test. Its
vague language can support a narrow or broad reading equally well.”).
118. Some basis for this idea is found in Jones, where the concurring Justices suggested that the crime being investigated might have some bearing on
the constitutionality of warrantless GPS tracking. United States v. Jones, 132
S. Ct. 945, 964 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) (“[T]he use of longer term GPS
monitoring in investigations of most offenses impinges on expectations of privacy.” (emphasis added)).
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Surprisingly, most of the analysis above would not change.
Any system that describes searches as the combination of mutually exclusive characteristics would create most of the problems this Note depicts. Indeed, the reasoning behind this conclusion would be almost perfectly analogous to the reasoning
above. In short, no matter which components of a search one
deems essential, the court’s current jurisprudence does a poor
job of finding them and explaining them with any particularity.
Instead, they remain hidden behind linguistic and conceptual
fog.
III. THE WAY OUT
The question posed, then, is whether there is any way to
remedy the problems that plague Katz without completely
abandoning the privacy interests that led the Supreme Court to
overrule Olmstead and its property rights rationale. Do privacy
and ambiguity go hand-in-hand?
For some, the challenge of defining expectations of privacy
has proven too daunting. Daniel Solove, for instance, recently
argued that courts should abandon the Katz standard altogeth119
er. Instead of seeking to uphold expectations of privacy, he
proposes that courts bar government searches that create “a
problem of reasonable significance,” ignoring the hunt for first
120
principles in favor of a totally pragmatic rule. While this
simplified approach has considerable merit, the confusion following Katz does not instill confidence in the ability of judges to
reliably weigh and protect private interests in the absence of
strict guidance.
There is, however, a middle ground. For all the chaos it has
created, Katz’s central conceit—that the Fourth Amendment
seeks to protect individual privacy and that Fourth Amendment rules should be tailored to that end—is worth preserving.
The defect in Katz lies not in its focus on privacy, but in its
failure to articulate any means of weighing the privacy interests implicated by any given set of facts.
This flaw can be repaired by altering the way Fourth
Amendment opinions are written. Most of the side effects of the
Katz decision arise from the way it shields from scrutiny the
true building blocks of a search: the passive subject and the active method. These important components are removed from
sight—but not from consideration—and it becomes very diffi119. Solove, supra note 14, at 1511–12.
120. Id. at 1514.
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cult to find the foundations of any Fourth Amendment law. Efforts to delve into the nuts and bolts of a search and seizure
end not in enlightenment, but in a confusing miasma.
The solution is for Fourth Amendment courts to reference
these elements explicitly, and explain how they each relate to
the holding. Directly connecting the subject and the method of
a search to a Fourth Amendment rule would prevent information from getting lost in interpretation. It would also place
solid, proactive rules on the books, helping to cabin government
121
invasions of privacy long before they reach a courtroom.
The easiest way to do this would be to develop a universal,
formulaic procedure for writing Fourth Amendment opinions.
Each of the two elements of a search would be addressed in
turn, and the privacy interests threatened by each would be
discussed systematically. Judicial minimalism, appearing so often in search and seizure cases as “decisions on the facts,”
would need to be abandoned. In its place, there would be an ever-expanding catalogue of clearly identified subjects of searches, and clearly described search methods, each connected to a
determination of constitutionality. Judges confronted with new
facts could simply locate the closest analogues and conduct a
straightforward comparison. Police officers, unsure of the proper way forward, could do the same. And the private individual
could finally know exactly what his government might be up to.
Practically speaking, how could this shift occur? There are
two broad possibilities: a top-down approach, and a bottom-up
approach. The former is more complete, but far less likely. It
would involve an explicit instruction from an appellate court—
ideally, the Supreme Court—to begin reframing Fourth
Amendment decisions. Lower courts would be compelled to focus on the constituent elements of each decision, and reviewing
courts would frown on “totality of the circumstances” tests. Of
course, given the Supreme Court’s generally erratic course in
the field of search and seizure, the odds of it adopting a highly
structured new approach seem low.
More gradual, but more plausible, is a bottom-up shift in
the way Fourth Amendment decisions are written, driven mostly by lower courts’ interest in writing stronger, more compre121. Of course, as long as the test for warrantless searches allows for a sui
generis holding limited to a particular set of facts, cases of first impression
will generate some uncertainty. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
Nevertheless, addressing the underlying elements of a search will at least
force judges to identify sui generis holdings as such, which may in turn limit
their frequency.
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hensible opinions. The recommendations provided above are
not an all-or-nothing proposition. They can also be read as
guidelines for writing clearer, more narrowly targeted, and
more jurisprudentially robust Fourth Amendment holdings.
Because the recommendations are about understanding the
structure of searches and take no position on which set of principles should be used to evaluate those searches, they can be
safely used by any court without fear of contravening substantive law. There are considerable incentives to adopt this new
approach: any trial court or appeals court that takes these proposals to heart should find its preferences easier to express in
the present, and its precedent easier to follow in the future. If
more and more of Fourth Amendment law were written according to these guidelines, the end result would ultimately be
much the same as if the change had been enacted by judicial
fiat.
This Note’s proposal is simultaneously broad in scope and
conservative in nature. It is true that, if it were fully embraced,
the proposal would necessarily affect virtually all warrantless
search holdings. As many of the cases referenced by this Note
demonstrate, judges today take a somewhat free-wheeling approach to answering Fourth Amendment questions. With so
many lines of reasoning to choose from, and so many confusing
standards and rules to follow, a judge confronting a Fourth
Amendment problem often has considerable discretion. That
discretion would be displaced by the more systematic approach
suggested here. Writing Fourth Amendment decisions to formula would greatly constrain the ability of judges to cut their
own way through the nettle of search and seizure precedent.
Instead, they would be encouraged to mechanically address a
handful of fundamental questions about the parameters of the
search.
But in many ways, the change this proposal envisions is
less fundamental than the changes envisioned by other pro122
posals to reorganize the Fourth Amendment. Unlike many
competing approaches, it leaves untouched the current dominant rationales for Fourth Amendment jurisprudence—
whatever they may be. It does not force courts to devise logically consistent search protections, reject any extant line of Fourth
Amendment case law, or alter the underlying interests protected by the current regime. Its strength is not dependent on its
ability to parse out the “true” justification for any particular
122. See, e.g., Solove, supra note 14, at 1514.
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rule. Instead, the proposal accepts the Amendment’s tendency
to produce a mass of overlapping rules and seeks only to categorize those rules so that they remain straightforward and robust. By limiting itself to the mechanics of Fourth Amendment
decisions, it leaves judges free to devise their own policies—or
follow preexisting ones—and merely counsels judges to change
the way they talk about those rules.
At the very least, reconciling judicial opinions with the
basic conceptual structure of government searches would encourage a deeper understanding of the stakes in any given
Fourth Amendment case. The current tendency to limit the
scope of decisions by rooting them in the “totality of the circumstances” enables judges to resolve constitutional disputes without ever addressing the broader issues posed by those dis123
putes.
While there is nothing inherently wrong with
approaching legal questions on a case-by-case basis, this practice, in the aggregate, has eroded privacy and created uncer124
tainty. Judges writing mechanistic decisions would be compelled to abandon the “totality of the circumstances” test in
favor of more nuanced deliberation, but otherwise, the judicial
process would suffer only minimal disruption. After all, questions relating the subject and the method of a search are bound
to occur in any Fourth Amendment case, regardless of whether
125
they are explicitly acknowledged.
CONCLUSION
There is always something utopian about any proposal to
change a body of law as large and ubiquitous as search and
seizure. The Fourth Amendment has remained bewildering for
many years, and there are few signs of immediate
improvement. But eventually, the Katz standard and the
Court’s current approach will need to be simplified, or
something more rigid and reliable will need to be substituted in
their place. As it stands, reading Fourth Amendment cases is
often less about analysis than it is about divination. That is an
unacceptable state of affairs for an area of law that represents
some of the most basic, common interactions between people
and their government.
Fortunately, many of the problems with the law surrounding Fourth Amendment arise from identifiable and predictable
123. See, e.g., Coffin v. Brandau, 642 F.3d 999, 1012 (11th Cir. 2011).
124. See supra Part II.C.
125. See supra Part II.B.
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sources. The Katz test allows too much judicial discretion when
deciding which searches to permit, and provides too little historical guidance. In an unlucky historical accident, Katz precedent creates structural pressure on attempts to limit the government’s ability to conduct searches. Judicial minimalism
exacerbates both these trends. Social change has resulted in a
hodgepodge of competing ideas about the Fourth Amendment.
And potential reformers have several advantages. The fact
patterns that make up Fourth Amendment cases are often simple variations on a theme, with most of the key elements recurring time after time. Searches themselves take a universal binary form, and can always be divided into two components:
subject and method. Although Fourth Amendment rules are
tangled, they can be untangled with dedicated analysis.
In the end, the simplest way to reorient the Fourth
Amendment is to change the way we talk about it. Its complexities feed on the vagaries of the Katz test, so those vagaries
should be rooted out. In their place courts should substitute a
simple, universal vocabulary of search and seizure. We have already wasted far too much time trying to parse simple rules out
of hazy reasoning. Whatever interests lie behind the Fourth
Amendment—property, privacy, or something else—they’ll only
be safe once we have got a search jurisprudence that is accessible and comprehensible.

